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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CARROLL FREEMAN, ANN MARIE FREEMAN, SIDNEY L. COHEN, KATHLEEN COHEN, PLATO G. CHRISTAPULOS, STELLA
A. CHRISTAPULOS, E. M. RICHARDSON,
!\ENNETH R. POULSEN, VIRGINIA C.
POULSEN, BENJAl\IIN N. MELDRUM,
GRACE D. MELDRUM, ERWIN F. ZEYER,
WILr,L\. GRACE ZEYER, EDWARD R.
O'HARA, EILEEN O'HARA, OSCAR SORENSON, M. ALICE SORENSON, EARL E.
LO:VIAN, HELEN M. LOMAN, ROBERT E.
themselves and for other land owners of
Indian Rock Subdivision,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

.\

Case
No.10590

LELAND 0. GEE, VILATE D. GEE, JAI\IES
;,'. CRANEH and IDA CRANER,
Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATE1\1ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
'rhis is an action commenced by residents of Indian
Rock Subdivision (plaintiffs-appellants are referred to
hereinafter as "plaintiffs"), a residential subdivision of
Salt Lake County, located in the general vicinity of 20th
~outh and 28th East Streets, in Salt Lake City (see subdivision plat, Exhibit 2P), to enjoin, and to recover damages for, the violation of restrictive covenants by def endnnts-respondents (hereinafter referred to as "defendants") who are also residents of the said subdivision.
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DISPOSI1'ION

I~ LO\Y~H

COUR'l'

On October 29, 19G5, a Pretrial Conference, Honorable Merrill C. Faux, Judge, presiding, was held, and resulted in a preliminary ruling by the Trial Court that the
restrictive covenants in question related only to the
original construction of defendants' homes rather than
also to the use made thereof by defendants. (R. GG.)
Subsequently, there were motions to amend the original
Pretrial Order (R. 68, 70, 79-81), and pla~ntiffs filed their
memorandum with respect to the interpretation of tlte restrictive covenants. (R. 90-108.) On December 13, 19G5,
the Pretrial Conference was continued. 'rhereafter, on
December 17, 1965, the Trial Court made and entered an
Amended Pretrial Order (R. 74-78), and on December
20, 1965, made and entered its Memorandum Decision
( R. 109), rendering its interpretation of the restrictive
covenants in question. Thereafter, the varties submitted
proposed Orders to the Court pursuant to the decision of
the Court. (R. 120-122, 123-125.) On January 13, 19G6,
former counsel for plaintiffs, Messrs. Greenwood and
Meservy of Salt Lake City, withdrew of record. (R. 110112.) Counsel appearing herein on behalf of plaintiffs
made their appearance. (R. 113-114.) After further proceedings in the Trial Court, which are discussed in greater detail hereinafter, the Trial Court, on March 8, 1966,
made and entered its Order dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice on the ground that the Complaint
failed to state a cause of action against defendants for use
of their residences for two-family occupancy. (R. 126-

128.)
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RELIFJF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Although there are collateral issues presented for deeision on this appeal, the basic issue for decision is
whether the Trial Court properly construed the restrictive cov0nants applicable to the lands and residences of
ho th plaintiffs and defendants as not prohibiting defendants' use of their residences for jncome-producing
occupmwy by two families. Plaintiffs seek reversal of the
Ordrr of the Trial Court dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint
upon the basis of the Trial Court's interpretation of the
covenants, and ask that the case be remanded for trial
upon the merits.
S'l'ATEMENT OF FACTS
'rhe restrictive covenants applicable to Indian Rock
Subdivision are appended to this brief as Appendix "A"
for convenient reference by the Court. Covenant I of the
covenants provides as follows:
"Each and every lot above described shall be
known and is he;eby designated as a 'Residential
Lot' and no structure shall be erected, altered,
placed or permitted to remain on any such 'Residential Lot' other than one detached single family
dwelling not to exceed two stories in height and a
private garage for no more than three automobiles,
except that one detached single family dwelling
or a duplex may he erected on each of Lots Nos.
30, 31, 38, 39, and 41." (Exhibit 4P.)
Defendants' residences are two-story homes, each so
('Onstrncte<l as to have an entrance to the main floor and
to the 1rnlk-out basement floor. Each floor is independent-
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ly equipped so as to be occupied by a :separate family.
It is conceded and agreed that for a period of time pri~r
to the initiation of this action, each of the defendants
occupied the main floors of their respective dwellings
and leased or rented the basement floors to other persons,
so that, in the case of both residences, it is clear that there
was occupancy by more than a single family, and that the
residences were so constructed as to provide for such
multiple residency. In fact, defendants' re::;idences are duplexes and have for some time been used as such. (Dep.
James F. Craner, 2-4, 7-11; Dep. Leland 0. Ge~, 14-10,
19-21, 22-23; Dep. Earl R. Belnap, 8-12.)
The record establishes that the lot owned by def endants Craner was acquired by a deed that expressly subjected the conveyance to the covenants theretofore recorded. (Exhibit lP.) Similarly, the lot owned by defendants Gee was acquired by the Gees on October 10,
1961, from Earl R. Belnap, the builder retained by the
Gees. (Exhibit 9P.) Belnap had acquired the lot on April
5, 1960, by a deed that expressly subjected the conveyance
to the covenants. (Exhibit 7P.) The policy of title insurance acquired by the Gees had appended to it a complete copy of the covenants. (Exhibit 6P.)
After plaintiffs' present counsel appeared in this action, they filed a motion with the Trial Court for reca.nsideration of the various orders of the 'rrial Court interpreting the restrictive covenants. In connection with
such motion, plaintiffs asked that they be relieved of .a
statement apparently made to the Trial Court by thell'
former counsel, Mr. Greenwood, to the effect that plain-
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\H're not seeking any relief by way of demolition
of defendants' residenC('S or any required change in the
php;ical features of th(e homes. The Trial Court denied
this rcilief and held that plaintiffs would be bound by the
alleged statements of their former counsel.
tiff~

ARO Ui\lEN'r
POINT I.
'l ILG
1

'rRIAL

COURT

ERRED

IN

ITS

A~.!ENDBD PRETRIAL ORDER OF DECEMBl~R 11', 1965, ITS MEMORANDUM DECI-

~ION OF DECEMBER 20, 1965, AND ITS
ORDI<JR OF MARCH 8, 1966, IN CONSTRU1NG THE INDIAN ROCK SUBDIVISION RESTR1,CTIVE COVENANTS AS NOT PRO! !IIWrING DEFI.iJNDANTS' USE OF LANDS
r:: ~3A!D SUBDIVISION FOR MULTIF,\l\llLY ffWELLINGS.

'11lic principal and narrow question for decision on

this appeal is whether the Trial Court properly construed
Covenant I of the covenants applicable to the Indian

Rock 8ubdivision. That covenant provides in relevant
riart that,
'·[~~Jo
structure shall he erected, altered,
placed or permitted to remain on any such 'Residential Lot' other than one detached single family
d',\'elli11g ... PXC('pt that one detached single family
dw0lling or a duplex may be erected on each of
Lots Kos. ;30, 31, 38, 39 and 41." (Exhibit 4P.)
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the meaning of
this covenant is clear and unambiguous. The term "singlefamily (h\'Plling" is used in contra-distinction to the term
''cl11ph'x.'' In thPir Answers on file herein, each of defend-
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6
ants admits that their homes as originally constructed
and as used and maintained, constitute two-family rather'
than single-family dwellings.(R. 16-18, 19-20, 45-47, 48-50.)
Plaintiffs therefore respectfully submit 1hat there can be
no question that the construction of defendants' twofamily dwellings was in patent violation of the quoted
covenant. Indeed, defendants have not contended that
the construction of their two-family dwellings did not
violate the covenants.
Defendants contended in the Trial Court, however,
that if the construction of their two-family dwelling:;
violated these covenants, plaintiffs' sole remedy would be
to require that the structures be demolished or altered so
as to constitute single-family dwellings rather than twofarnily dwellings. In other words, def en dun ts contend that
once they have succeeded in violating the covenant, plaintiffs are without any remedy save to require demolition.
In so contending, defendants take the position, sustained
by the Trial Court, that the quoted covenant imposes no
restriction whatever upon the use of a structure once it
has been erected-that the covenant restricts construction onl~', and has no relation to or bearing upon use.
This contention, and the various decisions and orders
of the Trial Court based thereon, are contrary to the
clear meaning and intent of the quoted covenant, and
violate established principles governing the interpretation
of restrictive covenants like the covenants here at issuP.
A very few courts appear to have distinguished between
covenants restricting construction only and covenants
restricting use, and have held that a covenant which ap-
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pears to restrict construction only will not restriet subsequent use of a structure once erected.
DELA WARE: Daniels Gardens v. Hilyard, 29 Del.
Ch. 33(), 49 A.2d 721 (1946).
PENNSYLVANIA: Jones v. Park Lane for Coni·alesccnts, Inc., 384 Pa. 268, 120 A.2d 535 (1956);
see dissent of Bell, J., joined by Stearne, J.
Contra: Gerstell v. Knight, 345 Pa. 86, 26 A.2d
:t~9 (1942); Pehlert v. Neff, 152 Pa. Super. 84,
31 A.2d 446 (1943).
Jordan v. Orr, 209 Ga. 161, 71 S.E. 2d
20() (1952).

GJ~ORGIA:

'rhese decisions however, to the extent, if at all that
they support defendants' claim, are contrary to the vast
\reight of authority. 'l'he overwhelming majority of cases
follow the far more persuasive and logical view that if a
restridive covenant precludes a property owner from
erecting a structure of a certain kind, the same covenant,
logically and reasonably, must be deemed to prohibit use
of a structure once erected for the same purposes as were
intended to be avoided by the prohibition of the restricted
structures.
ARIZONA: Ainsworth v. Elder, 40 Ariz. 71, 9 P.2d
1007 (1932).
CALIFORNIA: Walker v. Haslett, 44 C.A. 394, 186
Pac. 622 (1919); Bernstein v. Minney, et al., D6
Cal. App. 597, 274 Pac. 614 (1929) (dictum).
CONNECTICUT: Hooker v. Alexander, 129 Conn.
433, 29 A.2d 308 (1942).
ILLINOIS: Simons v. Work of God Corp., 3G Ill.
App. 2d 19D, 183 N.E. 2d 729 (1962).
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KEN'rUCKY: Meyer v. Stein, 284 Ky. -±97, 145 S.W.
2d 105 (1940).
l\lASSAiCHCSETTS: Po1cers v. Radding, 225 .:\Ia 8,,,
110, 113 N.E. 782 (1916).
MICHIGAN: Zelinski v. Becker, 318 l\lich. 209, ~I
N.W. 2d 615 (1947); Wood v. Blancke, 304 Mich.
283, 8 N.W. 2d 67 (1943); Michiana Shores Estates, Inc. v. Robbins, 290 Mich. 38-±, 287 N.W.
5-±7 (1939); Nerrerter v. Little, 258 l\1ich. -tG~,
:2-13 K.W. 25 (1932); Boston-Edison Protectire
Assa. v. Goodlove, 248 :Mich. 625, 227 N.W. 172
(1929); Holderness v. Central Sta.tes Financl'
Corp., 241 Mich. 604, 217 N.W. 764 (1928).
l\UNNESOTA: Burger v. City of St. Paul, 2-tl Minn.
285, G-1 N.W. 2d 73 (1954); Stra.uss v. Ginzberg,
218 Minn. 57, 15 N.W. 2d 130 (1944).
NEBRASKA: Hague v. Dreeze-n, 161 Neb. 268, i3
N.E. 2d 159 (1955).
NE\V JERSEY: Rosenblatt v. Levin, 127 N.J. Eq.
207, 12 A.2d 627, aff'd 1941, 129 N.J. Eq. 103, lS
A.2d 267 (1940)
NEW YORK: Kiernan v. Snou·den, 123 N.Y.S. ~d
895 (1953); Nielsen v. lliral Realty Corp., 172
::\lisc. 408, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 462 (1939); Neidlinger
v. N !'W York Ass'n. Etc., 121 Misc. 276, 200
"N .Y.S. 852 ( 1923) ; Bawnert v . ."fl(folkin, 235 N.Y.
115, 139 N.E. 210 (1923); Goodhue v. Pen11ell,
164 App. Div. 821, 150 N.Y.S. 435 (191-1).
OKLAHOMA: Mattson v. Fezler, 202 Okl. 589, 21fi
P.2d 275 ( 1949) ; Southwest Petroleion Company
v. Logan, 180 Okl. 4'77, 71 P.2d 759, 763 (1937).
TEXAS: Walker v. Dorris, 206 S.W. 2d G20 ('!'Px.
Civ. App., 1947).
YIRGINIA: Scl1warzchild v. Wellwrne, 186 Ya. 105~
-1-:5 R.E. 2d 152 (1947)
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WISCONSIN: Joyce v. Conway, 7 Wis. 2d 2-17, 9G
x.w. :2d 530 ( 1959).

Accordingly, in Joyce v. Conway, supra, the Wisconsin ~upreme Court held that a cownant against the erection of any building other than a one-family or singk•
dwelling house prohibited the conversion o.f a structure
oncP erl'cted to a two-apartment building so that it could
h~ occupied otherwise than as a one-family dwelling house.
In Kiernan v. Snowden, supra, the Supreme Court
of ?\" ew York held that a covenant against the erection of
any structure other than a single-family dwelling house
precluded the use of such a house, once erected, as a rooming housP.

In 8 imons v. Work of Go.d Corp., supra, the Illinois
Appdlah• Court held that a covenant that no apartment
or 1:>trueture for the separate housekeeping of more than
one family should be built or maintained upon a lot was
not nwrely a building restriction, but was also a use restriction.

In ·walker v. Haslett, supra, the California Appellate
Court held that a covenant prohibiting erection of any
lmilding other than a "first-class private residence" prohibitPd the use of a building already erected as a "double
or duplex house, or for any purpose tha:i that of a private
l'PsidPnce." (lSG P.2d 622 at 625.)

In Southwest Petroleum Comparvy v. Log·O!n, supra,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the covenant
langnag1• ''all lots in this plat are restricted to residences

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
only" to prohibit "all other uses upon the land ... " (il
P.2d 759 at 763.)
In Burger v. City of St. Paul, supra, the 1\linne~ota
Supreme Court held that:
''A use restriction or covenant restricting the
erection of any building except for residential pnrposes of a prescribed type applies to the use as
well as to the character of the building." (6-± N.W.
2d 73 at 80.)
In Hague v. Dreezen, supra, the Nebraska Supreme
Court held that a covenant proscribing erection of certain
classes of buildings "were intended to and had the purpose and effect of limiting the use of the lots to dwelling
houses, consisting of one dwelling house on each lot."
(73 N.W. 2d 159at164.)
Defendants rely on Jordan v. Orr, sitpra, and Jones
v. Park Lane for Convalescents, Inc., supra. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the extent to which these decisions,
if in fact they support defendants' view of this case, are
contrary to reason and the great weight of authority is
well-stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Bell in the
Jones case:

"In my opinion the parties clearly intended
'that the said property shall lJe used only for . · ·
private dwellings and appurtenances.' The majority opinion limits the restriction to original erection and permits a private dwelling house, one day
after erection, to be thereafter radically altered
and 'ilsed' for an entirely different purpose. That
is contrary to the language, meaning and i~t:nt
of the restriction. Although the majority opmwn I
is careful not to say so, it logically and necessanly

I
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holds that the owner of the servient tenarnent can
one month or oue day after the erection of a private dwelling completely remodel the interior or
t•xterior of the private dwelling or both, and since
the restriction has no application to use-which
ignores its 11se provision and clear intent-change
it into and 11se it for a store or a commercial building or a sanitarium or a building for any and every
other conceivable itse. I believe this is so unreasonable as to be absurd.
''.Whenever two interpretations of a written
instrument are reasonably possible, and one construction produces a reasonable result which is
in accord with the likely or clearly possible objPd, purpose and intent of the parties and the
other construction produces a result which is unreasonable or absurd, the latter construction
should never be adopted." (Emphasis in original.)
(120 Atl. 525 at 540.)
It cannot be doubted that to sustain the Trial Court,
and the view urged by defendants, would encourage
property owners to erect buildings secretly in violation
of so-called construction covenants, for once the buildings were completed, they could be used for any purpose.

The record in this case establishes that such a
eonrse of deception and concealment was indeed pur~ued by at least two o.f the defendants i~ this litigation.
It is a matter of record in this case that defendant Leland 0. Gee assured his neighbors in Indian Rock Subdivision in writing during the course of construction of
the Gee home that it would be occupied only by the Gees
and their family, and that it would not be used for
income purposes. (Exhibit lOP.) The Answer on file
an<l a Jlart of the record in this appeal establishes be-
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yond doubt that from the very beginning, defendants
Gee planned and carried forward the construction of a
two-family dwelling with full purpose and intent that
it be occupied by two separate families and used for income purposes. ( R. 19-20, 45-47 ; see also Dep. Leland
0. Gee, 16-17, 19-21.)
The record establishes with equal clarity that the
Craner dwelling was designed and planned from the
beginning as a two-family d\\Telling ( R. lG, 49), notwithstanding that defendant Craner was aware of the restriction prohibiting buildings other than single-fam;ly
dwellings. ( Dep. J arnes F. Craner, 5.)
The decision of the Trial Court interpreting the
covenants applicable to Indian Rock Subdivision was
rendered as a matter of law. No evidence was before the
Trial Court bearing upon the intention of the draftsmen
of the covenants. As this Court held in Parrish v. Richards, 8 U. 2d 419, 336 P. 2d 122 (1959), thE> interpretation
of restrictive covenants is governed by the same principles as are applicable to the interpretation of statutes.
It is, of course, settled that the intention of the legislatnn' is a consideration of the greatest importance in
the interpretation of statutes. Accordingly, and on the
same principles, the intention of those who prepared and
caused to be recorded the restrictive covenants applicaMe to Indian Rock Subdivision is a matter of the
greatest importance in rendering the proper interpretation of the covenants.
The primary evidence of the intent of those who
prepared and recorded the subject covenants is, of course.
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the content of the covenants themselves. Plaintiffs re~pectfully submit that the covenants themselves express
a manifest and clear intention to restrict the utilization
of lots in Indian Rock Subdivision to occupancy by one
family per dwelling. The overriding and paramount
purpose of restrictive covenants such as those here at
i'ssue is to protect, preserve and maintain the value and
integrity of properties subject to the covenants. Plaintiffs have invested in their dwelling sites and improvements in reliance upon cnvenants providing for restriction to single-family occupancy. Defendants would convert the Indian Rock Subdivision into a neighborhood
of rental multiple-family properties.
Even if the intent of the Indian Rock Subdivision
covenants is regarded as ambiguous with respect to the
r1uestion whether they control subsequent use as well as
original construction, the Trial Court erred. As has
been noted, the Trial Court had before it no evidence
other than the covenants themselves of the intention of
the parties.
"'l'he surrounding circumstances are taken into
consideration in determining the intention in some
cases, where it is necessary to do so by reason of
the uncertainty or ambiguity in the language
giving rise to the restriction. In such a case, the
location and character of the entire tract of land,
and whether or not the restriction is for the sole
benefit of the grant or for the benefit of the
grantee and subsequent purchasers, as well as
Y>hether it is in pursuance of a general building
plan for the development and improvement of the
property, must be considered. The object or purpnsl' which the covenant was designed to accom-
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plish is also taken into consideration." (20 Aiu.

J ur. 2d, Section 186, "Covenants, Conditions
Etc., pp. 754-755.)

'

Accordingly, this Court, in III etropolitan Inv. Cu. v. Sine
14 U. 2d 36, 37G P.2d 9-±0 (19G2), found a reshietiw
covenant "ambiguous and subject to interpretation [as
to duration] considering the intentions of the parties at
the time of its imposition" and held:
)

''Tht> intentions of the parties, as gatlwred froll!
the sunounding circumstances, and purpOSl' of
the restriction, must be considt-rt>d and giwn
effeet." (l-!: U. 2d 3G at -±3.)
Defendants have contended, and the Trial Court in
this case held, that the ambiguity that defendants assert
and the Trial Court apparently found in these covenants should be resolved in favor of the unrestricted me
of defendants' properties. This principle, however, is
subject to limitations apparentl)· disregarded by defendants and not considered by the Trial Court.
''Such construction in favor of the unrestricted
use, however, must be reasonable. The strict
rule of construction as to restrictions should not
be applied in such a way as to def eat the plain
and ohvious purposes of a restriction. (20 Am.
J ur. 2d Section 187, "Covenants, Conditions,
F~tc.," pp. 756-757.)

I

i

I

I

I
In summary, plaintiffs respectfully urge that as a
matter of law and based upon the overwhelming weight I
of authority, the admitted use that defendants have
made and are making of their properties violates t]H'
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lmlian Hock Subdivision covenants. If, however, this
Court should accept defendants' view that the covenants
are ambiguous as to whether they restrict use as well
as construction, then plaintiffs urge that the case should
be remanded for trial on the merits so that proper evi(knce of the intention of the parties can be adduced
for the purpose of resolving the claimed ambiguity. In
Pither event, the decision of the Trial Court peremptorily and as a matter of law defining away defendants'
rights as property owners, and as beneficiaries of the
to·wnants, should be overturned.
POINT II
'L'llE 'l'RIAL COURT ERRED IN JTS ORDER

OF MARCH 8, 1966, IN DENYING PLAIN'l'LF'FS' 1\IOTION THAT 'l'HEY BE RELIEVED OF THE EFFECT OF STATEMENTS
,\lADE TO THE TRIAL COURT BY PLAINTIFFS' FORMER COUNSEL.

It appears from the record that at some point in the
pretrial proceedings, plaintiffs' former counsel, Messrs.
Gn•mwood and .Meservy, may have advised the Trial
Court that the plaintiffs were not seeking demolition or
an.\· change in the outward physical aspects of the defPndants' two-family dwellings. Immediately upon aplH'aring on behalf of plaintiffs, the undersigned applied
to the Trial Court to be relieved of this statement on
the ground that it was apparently made to the Trial
Court upon the basis of a misunderstanding between
plaintiffs and their then counsel, and upon the further
ground that under the view of this case taken hy the
lll1(1c·rsi b"'lled ' too·ether
with the view of the Indian Rock
b
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8ubdivision restrictive covenants taken by defendants,
vlaintiffs would he entitled to require demolition 01
alteration o.f defendants' two-family dwellings. The Trial
Court treated the alleged statement of prior counsel as
a formal stipulation abandoning relief originally sought
in plaintiffs' Complaint and Amended Complaint, and
incorporated the abandonment in its final order of dismissal over the objections of plaintiffs' present cnun::;d
(R. 126-128.)
It is, of course, settled that the court may relieve
parties of stipulations. ( 50 Am. J ur. § § 11, 14, "Stipulations," pp. 611-614.) .Moreover, the statement apparently
made by plaintiffs' former counsel certainly does nut
rise to the level of a stipulation, and would have been,
at most, a stat1m1ent of counsel's intentions with re:,;peet
to this case. 'l'he statement contained in the Trial Court's
order of dismissal so indicated. ( R. 126.) Accordingly,
plaintiffs respectfully urge that the refusal of the Trial
Court to permit plaintiffs' counsel to pursue this ca~r
and to undertake the protection of the plaintiff8' righto
and interest in conforrnity with present counsel's vie1r
of the case and the instructio.ns of the plaintiffs was a
manifest abuse of discretion that alone warrants the
reversal of th(" decision made by the Trial Court. Again,
there were not sufficient facts before the Trial Court
upon ·which the Trial Court could have decided whether
pl:>.intiffs were entitled to the relief that the Trial Court
now has held plaintiffs cannot seek in any event. 'l'lw
decision of the Trial 'Court, of course, does not purporl
to he a decision on the merits on this point but merely
Sf·Pks to bind plaintiffs to a claimed abandonment of
relief sought under the terms of plaintiffs' Complaint
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and Amended Complaint and now sought by plaintiff:::;'
present counsel.
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the refusal of
tlw 'l'rial Court to permit plaintiffs to seek the relief
to which they may be entitled on the facts provides a
sound and important basis for overturning the order of
dismissal entered by the Trial Court and. remanding this
ruse for trial on the merits.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Trial Court
committed error in misconstruing the Indian Rock Subdivision covenants in a vacuum, without any consideration of the manifest and obvious purposes for ·which the
covenants were adopted and without taking into account
the intentions of the parties who prepared the covenants
and caused them to be recorded. Further, plaintiffs submit that the Trial Court erred in unduly and prejudicially
l'Pstricting the remedies available to plaintiffs for defendants' violations of the covenants. Upon these grounds,
plaintiffs urge that the order o.f dismissal of the Trial
Court be reversed and that the case be remanded for
trial upon the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
YAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Leonard J. Lewis
C. Keith Rooker
Attorneys for
Plaintiff s-Appclla nts
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APPJ::;NDIX "A"
BUILDING RES'l'RICTlONS
INDIAN ROCK SUBDIVISION
Kl\OvY ALL l\IEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That the undersigned owners of the following described
real property situated in Salt Lake County State of
.'
Utah:
All of Lots 1 to ±1, both inclusive INDIAN ROCK
Subdivision, according to the official plat therPof
on file in the office of the County Recorder of
Salt Lake County, Utah,
hereby declare that all and each of said lots above described shall be subject to and shall be eonveyed subject
to the Reservations, Restrictions and Covenants hereinafter set forth.
I

Each and every lot above described shall be known and
is hereby designated as a "Residential Lot" and no structure shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any such "Residential Lot" other than one de- ,
tached single family dwelling not to exceed two stories
in height and a private garage for not more than three
automobiles, except that one detached single farnily
dwelling or a duplex may be erected 0n each of Lots
Nos. 30, 31, 38, 39, and 41.

I

II

Every dwelling erected on any of the following de~cribed lots : Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 28, 29, 32 and 33. shall han

1·

I
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a ground floor 1:>quare foot area, exclusive of open
porches or attached garages, of not less than 1200 square
fret. All other lots not less than 1400 square feet.

III
Xo building 1:>hall be erected, placed o.r altered on any
building plot in this subdivision until the building plans,
specifications, and plot plan showing the location of
such building have been approved in writing as to confonnity and harmony of external design with existing
structures in the subdivision, and as to location of the
building with respect to topography and finished ground
elevation, by a committee composed of Richard R. Hoyt,
.T ohn Glauser and J. Alvon Glauser, or by a representative designated by a majority of the membern of said
committee. In the event of death or resignation of any
member of said committee, the remaining member or
members shall have full authority to approve or disapprove such design and location or to designate a repre.8entative with like authority. In the event said committee,
Oi' its designated representative, fails to approve or disapprove such design and location within 30 days, after
~aid plans and specifications have been submitted to
it or, in any event, if no suit to enjoin the erection o.f
sud1 building or the making of such alterations has been
commenced prior to the completion thereof, such approval will not be required and this Covenant will ,be
dc•emed to have been fully complied with. Neither the
nwmbers of such committee, nor its de~ignated repre8c•ntative shall be entitled to any compensation for ser\'ices performed pursuant to this Covenant. The powers
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and dufo>s of such committee, and its designated repre.
sentative, shall ccase on and after l\lay 1st, 1957, then
after, the a11proval described in this covenant shall not !
be required unless prior to said date and effectiw
thereon, a written instrument shall be executed by t] 11,
then record owners o.f a majority of the lots in thi~
subdivision and duly recorded appointing a representative, or representatives, who shall thereafter exercise the
same powers previously exernised by said committee.
1

IY
No building shall be locatt>d nearer to the front residential lot line than the building limit line as shown on
the recorded plat of said Indian Rock. However, covered
or uncovered, but not enclosed porches, balconies, pork
cocheres, or terraces may extend beyond the building
limit line not more than 12 feet, and eustornar~· architectural ap1mrtenances, such as cornicPs, bay windo\\'>
spoutings, chimneys, may extend not more than four
feet beyond said building line. ~teps leading to dwelling
may extend beyond such building line provided such
steps are not higher than the floor level of the first ,
floor of the dwelling. No building shall be located nearer
to either side line of a residential lot than 8 feet. No
residential structure shall be erected or placed on an)·
building plot, which plot has an area of less than GJOO
square feet or a width of less than 70 feet at the front '
building setback line.

v
No noxious of offensive trade or activity shall be carried
on upon any residential lot hereinbefore described or
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an:; part or portion thereof, nor shall anything be done
thereon which may become an annoyance or nuisance to
(]w oecnpants of the remaining residential lots hereinbefore described.

VI
:lo traih·r, basement, tent, shack, garage, or other outlmilding erected in, upon or about any of said residential
lots hereinbefore described or any part thereof shall at
any time be used as a residence temporarily or permanently, nor shall any structure of a temporary character
he used as a residence.

VII
':\o structure shall be moved onto any residential lot
herrinbefore described or any part thereof unless it
meets with the approval of the Committee hereinbefore
named, such approval to be given in writing.

VIII
Xo signs, billboards or advertising structures may be
erected or displayed on any of the residential lots hereinbefore described or parts or portions of said residPntial lots except that a single sign, not more than 3 x 5
f Pet in size, advertising a specific lot for sale or house
for rent, may be displayed on the premises affected.

IX
Xo trash, ashes or any other refuse may be thrown or
dumped on any residential lots hereinbefore described
01· any part or portion thereof.
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x
All covenants and restrictions herein stated and set forth
shall run with the land and shall be binding on all the
parties and persons claiming any interest in said residential lots hereinbefore described or any part thereof
until 25 years from the date hereof, at which time said
covenants and restrictions shall be automatically extended for successive periods of 10 years unless by a
vote of the majority of the then owners of said residential lots, it is agreed to change the said covenants in
whole or in part.

XI
H the parties now claiming any interest in said midential lots hereinbefore described, or any of them, or
their heirs, successors, grantees, personal representatire
or assigns, shall violate or attempt to ·violate any of the
covenants and restrictions herein contained prior to 20
years from the date hereof, it shall be lawful for any
other verson O·r persons owing any other residential
lot or lots in said area to prosecute any proceedings at
law or in equit against the person or persons, firms or
corporations so violating or attempting to violate any
such covenant or covenants and/or restrictions or rr·
striction, and either prevent him or them from so doing
or to recover damages or other dues for such violation
or violations.

XII
Invalidation of any one of the covenants and restriction;
hereinbefore set forth by judgment or court order shall
in no "·ise affect any of the other provisions hereof which
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remain in full force and effect until 25 years from
the date hereof subject to automatic extension as providPd in Paragraph X hereof.
~hall

s/ Lena Glauser
s/ John Glauser
s/ Richard R. Hoyt
s/ Maude S. Hoyt
Owners

STA 'T'E OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake
On the 25th day of April, A.D. 1952 personally ap111•ared before me JOHN GLAUSER and LENA GLAUSl~R. his wife, and RICHARD R. HOYT and MAUDE S.
HOYT, his wife, the signers of the foregoing instrument,
\rho duly acknowledged to me that they executed the
~amP.

LUCILE R. WRIGHT
NOTARY PUBLIC,
residing at:
Salt Lake City, Utah

iSlGAL)
~ry

commission expires 12/10 /55.

CERTIFICATE

STATE OF FTAH
Conni~· of Salt Lake

Lss

r·

I, Hazel Taggart Chase, Recorder in and for the County
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the
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foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the original
Building restriction No. 1283GG2, as appears of record
in my o.ffice.

lN Wl'l'NESS WHEREOF, l have
hereunto set mv hand and affixed DIY
official seal, tl;is 21st day of Septen;.
her, A.D. 1965.
By H. S. Ensign
Deputy Recorder
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